USL or MLS Next Pro: Why New Pro Clubs Choose One or the Other
Fans often frame the USL versus MLS Next Pro debate in ideological terms. Championship leagues versus development leagues. Independent clubs versus reserve teams. Global soccer traditions vs the American minor league sports system.
Many owners do not think about it that way.
For an ownership group evaluating which league to join, the decision is less about philosophy and more about risk tolerance, cost structure, governance, and long-term asset strategy. When viewed through that lens, the choice between the United Soccer League ecosystem and MLS Next Pro becomes much clearer.
The MLS Next Pro Case: Stability and Cost Control
The strongest argument for MLS Next Pro is structural stability.
The league exists within the broader orbit of Major League Soccer, which fundamentally alters the investment profile. Even independent teams are operating inside a system that is institutionally backed, commercially integrated, and unlikely to disappear suddenly. That kind of league-level stability matters far more to investors than online debates about sporting identity.
Entry costs are generally lower, and the operating model can be more flexible. An ownership group can choose to spend aggressively, but it is not structurally required to do so in the same way as a fully independent competitive club. In some cases, partnerships, loans, and developmental positioning can reduce roster risk and operating volatility.
Regionalization is another practical advantage. Travel costs are a major expense in lower division soccer, and MLS Next Pro’s structure can significantly reduce that burden compared to fully national competition.
There is also the effect of brand adjacency. Casual sports consumers recognize the MLS connection even if they do not actively follow MLS Next Pro itself. For certain markets, that association can provide a baseline level of legitimacy that would otherwise take years to build.
Most importantly, MLS Next Pro allows for a lower-risk ownership model. An investor can operate a professional club with more predictable cost controls and without needing to position the organization as a fully independent competitive institution from day one.
The USL Case: Independence, Identity, and Long-Term Upside
The USL value proposition is fundamentally different.
Clubs in the USL system are independent first and foremost. Matches are played against other independent organizations with their own local ambitions, identities, and supporter cultures. For ownership groups looking to build a standalone civic sports brand rather than a system-aligned operation, that distinction is significant.
Governance is another factor. Independent owners generally have more influence within the USL structure than they would inside a league closely tied to MLS priorities. For ambitious operators who want a real voice in league direction, that autonomy has tangible value.
There is also the question of long-term competitive upside. USL’s planned promotion and relegation model introduces the possibility of upward mobility within its own ecosystem. It creates a sporting ladder that makes elevation to Division I possible.
From a commercial standpoint, USL also has a longer track record of franchise valuations, media distribution, and limited revenue sharing mechanisms. While imperfect, that history provides investors with comparables and precedent that a newer league structure cannot yet offer.
Supporter culture, while harder to quantify, is another real consideration. USL as a whole has a more established independent club culture, whereas MLS Next Pro is still primarily perceived as a development-oriented environment with a mix of reserve and independent teams.
The Investor Time Horizon Problem
One under-discussed factor in this decision is investor time horizon.
Not every owner is trying to build the same type of asset. Some are looking for a stable, cost-controlled sports property with predictable operations and limited downside. Others are pursuing a long-term civic and sporting project built around identity, infrastructure, and competitive credibility.
MLS Next Pro naturally appeals to shorter-to-medium horizon investors. The cost structure is more flexible, league stability is higher, and the expectations around competitive ambition are structurally lower.
USL, by contrast, is a longer horizon investment. It requires greater commitment to brand building, community engagement, and competitive infrastructure. The potential upside is higher, but so is exposure to volatility. For ownership groups that view their club as a multi-decade sporting institution rather than a controlled operating asset, that tradeoff can be attractive.
Stadium Control, Territory, and Asset Leverage
Another factor rarely discussed in fan debates is how differently the two ecosystems interact with stadium development and territorial value.
USL clubs are far more likely to anchor stadium projects, redevelopment initiatives, and municipal partnerships as primary civic sports properties. This creates leverage beyond matchday revenue. A club tied to a stadium and local development strategy can function as a long-term regional asset rather than simply a tenant in a league structure.
Territory protection, while controversial among supporters, can also be seen as a positive from an investor standpoint. Securing a defined market within the USL system allows an owner to establish long-term brand entrenchment and commercial exclusivity.
MLS Next Pro offers fewer established precedents for independent clubs in this area. The league’s centralized structure and MLS alignment can limit the degree to which an independent team becomes the singular professional soccer identity in its market.
Player Development and Transfer Economics
Player development philosophy is another key differentiator.
MLS Next Pro is structurally aligned with development pipelines into MLS first teams. For affiliated clubs, this is a clear advantage. For independent clubs, however, the long-term economics of outbound transfers are less established.
Within the USL ecosystem, independent clubs have increasingly demonstrated a credible pathway for selling players abroad for transfer fees. Direct transfers to European clubs, including recent record fees at the USL League One level, reinforce the viability of a player trading model built around first-team minutes and independent exposure.
For an ambitious owner, this creates an additional revenue pathway. A well-run club can function not only as a competitive entity, but also as a talent development and transfer asset.
By contrast, independent teams operating within a development-branded league may face perception challenges in the global market, where players are often viewed as part of a broader MLS pipeline rather than as standalone professionals unless the club has already established a strong independent identity.
The Constraint Few Fans Acknowledge: Territory and Availability
In reality, the choice is not always purely strategic.
If a market has already been claimed within one league’s expansion structure, ownership groups may effectively be pushed toward the alternative. League geography, expansion timelines, and stadium logistics often shape the decision before philosophical preferences even enter the conversation.
Owners are not always choosing between two abstract models. They are choosing between the viable option available in their market and the capital requirements attached to it. If neither is available, then they may look to a third option like NISA.
USL’s Nightmare Scenario: A Historical Precedent
There is also important historical context that complicates the current debate.
For years, USL operated in close partnership with MLS and hosted numerous MLS reserve and developmental teams alongside independent clubs. The league functioned as a hybrid ecosystem. At the same time, the NASL positioned itself as the home of fully independent professional clubs and marketed that independence as a core differentiator.
Philosophically, that model appealed to many investors.
Structurally, it proved far more fragile.
As instability grew, several NASL clubs migrated into the USL ecosystem, which offered greater institutional stability and operational continuity. Eventually, NASL lost sanctioning and collapsed as a professional league, with USL absorbing much of the independent lower-division space by default.
Only after the collapse of NASL did MLS formalize its own lower-division structure through the creation of MLS Next Pro.
In other words, the dynamic is not entirely new. The alignment has simply flipped. Previously, USL was the partially MLS-aligned league competing with a fully independent rival. Now, USL represents the more independent model while MLS Next Pro is the league most densely populated with reserve and affiliated teams.
It is also worth noting that even during its MLS partnership era, USL was never as saturated with reserve teams as MLS Next Pro is today. Independent clubs were always central to its identity rather than supplementary.
The MLS Next Pro to MLS Assumption
There is also a persistent assumption in some markets that participation in MLS Next Pro increases the likelihood of eventually receiving a full MLS franchise.
That assumption is understandable, but historically it is not well supported.
It is true that several MLS expansion clubs previously operated in USL or NASL, including teams like Seattle, Portland, Vancouver, Orlando City, Minnesota United, FC Cincinnati, and Nashville SC. However, those moves were not the result of a formal promotion pathway. They were opportunistic expansions shaped by ownership strength, stadium control, market viability, and broader league strategy.
In several of those cases, MLS was partnered with USL at the time, and yet affiliation still did not function as a guaranteed pipeline. Clubs were selected because they met MLS’s expansion criteria, not because they were next in line within a developmental hierarchy.
That distinction matters even more in the current landscape.
MLS operates under a closed franchise model that is structurally closer to the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL than to a global soccer pyramid. Expansion is deliberate, expensive, and market-driven. Now that MLS has reached roughly thirty clubs, a scale comparable to the other major North American leagues, future expansion is likely to be increasingly selective rather than routine.
In that context, MLS Next Pro should be understood as an internal development and operational league, not a staging ground for independent ownership groups seeking elevation. Proximity to the MLS ecosystem may provide branding benefits and operational stability, but it does not constitute a ladder into Division I.
Even during earlier eras when lower-division clubs eventually joined MLS, the pathway was never linear. In the current structure, there is even less evidence that participation in MLS Next Pro materially increases the likelihood of receiving an MLS franchise.
The Cynical View, and the Real Deciding Factor
This history can create a cynical belief that the long-term victory of the MLS ecosystem is inevitable. Greater institutional backing, lower operational risk, and tighter structural integration with the top tier are powerful incentives for risk-averse investors.
But the long-term balance of power in lower-division American soccer has historically been shaped more by execution than by structural assumptions.
The key variable that did not exist during the NASL versus USL era is promotion and relegation. If USL successfully implements a credible and sustainable pro-rel structure with USL Premier at the top as a Division I league, it fundamentally changes the owner calculus. It offers something structurally different: upward sporting mobility within an independent club framework.
In that scenario, USL becomes the more compelling ecosystem for ambitious owners who value autonomy, identity, and long-term competitive upside.
However, the inverse is also true.
If promotion and relegation is poorly executed, indefinitely delayed, or fails to create meaningful competitive and commercial differentiation, USL risks becoming the higher-cost and higher-volatility alternative to a more stable MLS-aligned structure. In that environment, history suggests a gradual drift rather than a dramatic collapse. Strong operators prioritize stability. Weaker clubs disappear. Survivors migrate toward the more secure ecosystem.
The outcome is not predetermined. It will not be decided by branding, rhetoric, or online narratives.
It will be decided by execution.
